By Kaveh

U.S. political involvement, covert and overt, dates back to 1953 (Kinzer, 2005). In addition to coups, plots of assassination, and secret operations, comes American contribution to the export and sales of arms to local governments, Egypt, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, etc… and direct military involvement with the establishment of bases, invasion and occupation, e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan. The size of the Defense Department’s holding world-wide amounts to 29,819,492 acres, according to Chalmer Johnson (2006, p. 140), and a considerable portion of that is in the Middle East. Currently the United States holds bases in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan and up to 13, 546 troops afloat in the seas of the Middle East (Johnson, 2006, p. 140). There are bases and garrisons in Afghanistan, Iraq (106 garrisons as of May 2005), Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Qatar, and Uzbekistan. Despite Jordan’s denial of having any special military arrangements with the U.S., no bases, and no American military presence, the United States has deployed up to five thousand troops in bases on the Jordan-Iraqi and Syrian borders (Johnson, 2006, p. 141).

The importance of the Middle East for the U.S. is nothing new and goes back more than a few decades. In 1957, four years after a CIA-sponsored coup in Iran, the U.S. congress approved a presidential resolution known s the Eisenhower Doctrine, which designated the Middle East as an area vital to the national interest of the United States. As with the Monroe Doctrine and Truman Doctrine, the United States government granted itself the remarkable and inexorable right to intervene militarily in yet another part of the world. When any U.S. administration says “our” interests must be protected abroad they tend to refer to mean some insecure condition in which our interests are endangered. This insecurity can be manufactured, however. Insecure social and political conditions in a country previously unknown to most Americans can suddenly cause it to become vital to our interest. To protect our sons and daughters we have to participate in overseas military ventures, and our taxes are needed to finance these ventures (Parenti, p. 46). What better place than the Middle East where social relations, cultures, and political institutions remain ‘barbaric,’ ‘savage,’ ‘uncivilized,’ or ‘mysterious’ and ‘puzzling’ at best?

From the 1950s to the 1970s American military presence in the Middle East was minimal. But the days of the Nixon doctrine—let the locals fight their own wars—have passed. The last time the United States removed its forces from anywhere was in October of 1983 when Reagan ordered American Marines to leave Lebanon after a suicide bombing took the lives of 241 Marines. The notion of direct military involvement however, commenced with President Jimmy Carter on January 23, 1980, when he claimed that “Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force,” which he called Rapid Deployment Force. On January, 1, 1983, the Reagan administration converted Rapid Deployment Force to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the first regional command created in 35 years.

American military bases continued to grow in size starting with the 1991 Gulf War and George H. Bush’s declaration of a New World Order. The United States military has been gaining power and territory in the Gulf region ever since. Today there are more than 70 American military bases of all sizes in the Persian Gulf region alone. When retired Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Karen Kwiatkowski was asked about the U.S. intentions in Iraq and the reasons behind the occupation, she replied, “one reason has to do with our relations with Saudi Arabia, particularly the restrictions on our basing…So we were looking for alternate strategic locations beyond Kuwait, beyond Qatar, to secure something we had been searching for since the days of Carter—to secure the energy lines of communication in the region. Bases in Iraq, then, were very important.” Later in the Spring of 2005, Kwiatkowski stated that the Pentagon was trying to protect Israel from Syria and Iran, giving the United States more reason to stay regardless of the Iraqi’s desires (Johnson, 2006, p. 158).

The National Security Strategy of the United States claims that “The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols of the U.S. commitments to allies. The United States demonstrates its resolve to maintain a balance of power that favors freedom. To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces” (Johnson, 2006, p. 151).

Arms Sales to the Middle East

In 2003, 72 percent of U.S. foreign aid allotted to the Middle East was used for military purposes, as opposed to 28 percent for economic development, according to Stephen Zunes. The $3.8 billion in military aid is well over 90 percent of what the United States gives the entire world, (Zunes, 2003, p. 42). In 2001, more than half of the world’s total purchase of arms from the United States went to the Middle East totaling $6.1 billion. Since 1992, the U.S. arms exports to the Middle East totaled $90 billion, more than all other countries combined (Johnson, 2006, p. 158). Although seemingly contradictory for shipments of arms to continue to flow to a region already saturated with war, violence, and insecurity, the United States perseveres in its relentless arming of the region.

The new civilian leadership at the Pentagon, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Zalmay Khalilzad, and Stephen Cambone, for example, came into power with two major objectives, according to Scahill: “regime change in strategic nations and the enactment of the most sweeping privatization and outsourcing operation in the U.S. military history—a revolution in military affairs. After September 11, 2001, this campaign became unstoppable.”

Based on reports by the Center for Defense Information (CDI), there is a long-standing tenet of U.S. arms export policy that arms transfers should not undermine long-term security and stability, weaken democratic movements, support military coups, escalate arms races, exacerbate ongoing conflicts, cause arms build-ups in unstable regions, or be used to commit human rights abuses. However, the Bush administration and those before it have demonstrated a willingness to provide weapons and military training to weak and failing states and countries that have been repeatedly criticized by the U.S. State Department for human rights violations, lack of democracy, and even support of terrorism.

Using U.S. government data, CDI has documented that, in the five years after Sept. 11, total U.S. arms sales (Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales) to some 25 countries—mostly in the Middle East region—were worth four times more than those concluded in the five years prior to Sept. 11, and these countries received 18 times more total U.S. military assistance (Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training) after Sept. 11 than before. Furthermore, 72 percent of the countries in this series received more military assistance and 64 percent conducted more arms sales with the United States during the five years after Sept. 11 than during the entire period between the end of the Cold War and Sept. 11, from 1990 to 2001.

While total U.S. Foreign Military Sales between 2002 and 2006 totaled approximately $9 billion less than between 1997 and 2001, the United States has increased sales to new post-Sept. 11 allies, and has made several large arms deals, including a multi-billion dollar sale of F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan. Total Foreign Military Sales projections for 2006 through 2008 are higher than any other year since the end of the Cold War.

According to David Houska, threats from Iran, Syria, and various terrorist groups, justified the Bush administration to offer more than $60 billion in new weapons and military assistance to Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other U.S. allies in the Middle East. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced the latest U.S.-Middle East arms sales campaign July 30, 2008, just before she and Secretary of Defense Gates traveled to the region. Although Rice characterized the proposals as the continuation of long-standing U.S. policy, she said that the deals were intended to “help bolster forces of moderation and support a broader strategy to counter the negative influences of al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran.” Former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns underscored the threat from Iran, saying that the future sales will “provide a deterrence against Iranian expansionism and Iranian aggression in the future.” With this new agreement the United States supplies $3 billion and $1.3 billion of military aid to Israel and Egypt, respectively, each year for 10 years starting in fiscal year 2009, which began Oct. 1, 2008. The new plans represent a 25 percent increase in aid to Israel and a continuation of Egyptian aid at present levels. Burns signed the agreement with Israel on Aug. 16, 2007. The sales do not end with Egypt and Israel as they were extended to the old Soviet Republics.

Since Sept. 11, Armenia, Azerbaijan, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro) have all been removed from U.S. sanctions lists and are eligible for U.S. military assistance. This occurred despite reports by the State Department that all of these countries have committed human rights abuses. It also neglects to consider India’s and Pakistan’s ongoing nuclear programs and continued conflict. The United States is sending unprecedented levels of military assistance to countries that it simultaneously criticizes for lack of respect for human rights. Consistently, failures are rewarded through sales of arms that in turn exacerbate the failures.

As Rachel Stohl, a military analyst in the Center for Defense Information, wrote on December 30, 2008, “foreign policy concerns—such as the global war on terror—contributed to increased U.S. arms sales to allies assisting with the global effort. Regional tensions – either real or perceived – have also led to increased purchases, particularly in the Middle East and Africa.” According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, military expenditures in the Middle East countries came to 54.8 percent of combined central government expenditures, just over 20 percent of the GDP. Force ratios—representing the number of people under arms per thousand—stood at 13.5 percent for the Middle East. Such spending is twice that of industrial countries and well over three times that of most developing countries.

Bill Buzenberg reported in an article for the Center of Public Integrity on November 19, 2007, reported that from 2004 to 2006, KBR Inc, previously a Halliburton subsidiary, was awarded more than $16 billion in U.S. government contracts, for work in Iraq and Afghanistan. The cost of war so far, according to National Priorities Project is between $1 trillion and $3 trillion (Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008).

In 2007, private security guards working for Blackwater or Dyncorp were earning $1,222 per day, which amounted to $445,000 per year. An Army sergeant, on the other hand, was earning $140-190 per day in pay and benefits, a total of $51,100 to $69, 350 per year (Stiglitz, p. 12). In August 2005, Lawrence J. Korb, an assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration, claimed that the Raptor (F-22), a Lockheed Martin product, which cost $360 million each, was “the most unnecessary weapon system being built by the Pentagon” (Scheer, 2008, p. 14). However, after September 11, 2001, even though the F-22 had no conceivable role in the preventing future attacks by terrorists, the stealth plane and every other weapons system rendered obsolete were suddenly repackaged as anti-terrorist weapons. Another example of such spending was the B-2 bomber, a product of Norhtrop Grumman, at a cost of $1.2 billion each. This bomber was originally designed to penetrate the Soviet air system a tactic that became useless with the end of the Cold War. It was in fact tested for the first time in the summer of 1989, coinciding with the end of the Cold War. However, after the declaration of war on terror it was abruptly found useful. The B-2 was designed to avoid sophisticated defense systems that neither the Taliban, Saddam Hussein, nor al-Qaeda possessed (Scheer, p. 18).

Additionally there were the Virginia-class attack submarines, at the cost of $2.5 billion each, and the Boeing’s V-22 Osprey tilt rotor aircraft that combines the vertical takeoff and landing of a helicopter. The plane’s production continues at a cost of $55 billion (Scheer, p. 19). In October of 2001, Lockheed Martin was given a contract by the Pentagon for what became a $300 billion project to construct the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, a multiservice combat plane. As Scheer puts it, “the business of the military, particularly the expenditure of huge sums of taxpayer money on weapons systems, is by design an opaque subject having more to do with bureaucratic prerogatives and corporate profits than the actual use of these weapons in waging war (Scheer, p. 33).”

The privatization of war on behalf of the United States has heavily contributed to private companies and think tanks to research and justify the furtherance of armed conflict anywhere in the world. There is a connection between defense contractors’ push for war, war profiteering and policy making. From 1998 to 2003, Halliburton’s contribution to the Republican Party totaled $1,146, 248 while $55, 650 went to the Democratic Party. For this contribution and probably other unknowable amounts, Halliburton received at least $19.3 billion in single-source, no-bid contracts (Stiglitz, p. 15).

While the profits of private contractors could be measured in specific numbers, the way contracts are panned out by the government remain a mystery. According to the Government Accountability Office: “Neither DoD nor the Congress reliably knows how much the war is costing and how appropriated funds are being used or have historical data useful in considering future funding needs” (Scahill, p. 13).

In 2007, according to National Income and Product Accounts, the military budget exceeded $1 trillion ($1,002.5 billion), which was 7.3 percent of the GDP. For all remaining countries, including Russia, China, U.K., and France, it was $1.3 trillion. America has been transformed in recent decades by the absence of the Soviet Union, giving the United States more immediate power (particularly in the military realm), together with a global hegemonic economic decline. It is this dual reality of a temporary increase in U.S. power along with indications of its long-term decline, according to James Cypher, that has led to urgent calls throughout the power elite for a “New American Century.” Likewise, it has led to attempts by Washington to leverage its enormous military power to regain economic and geopolitical strength in areas like the Persian Gulf (Cypher, 2007). Through this process the United States has built a lasting physical presence around the world that allows for perpetual control.

Many, like Scheer, perceive the recent American adventure in the Middle East and the U.S. military expenditure as inconsistent with a history of American militarism, therefore perceiving the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as deviant inclinations of a particular administration with particular ideology. According to Scheer, September 11th proved to be too good of an opportunity for Bush to pass up. He surrendered his presidency to those who identified national security with a wildly expansive U.S. presence in the world (Scheer, p. 3). But the recent venture is not an inconsistency or break from American foreign policy in the past decades?

Since the early Cold War era we have witnessed a “military Keynesianism”: the view that by promoting effective demand and supporting monopoly profits, military spending could help place a floor under U.S. capitalism (Bellamy Foster, p. 3). In essence, the U.S. government is not just spending money on the military and producing destructive weapons, or engaging in wars and interventions that at times seem too bellicose and too ambitious; it is also building a lasting physical presence around the world that yearns for conflict, control, subversion, and rapid deployment (Johnson, 2006). American physical presence in the Middle East specifically revolves around a general failure; failure to bring stability, peace and democracy to the region. The more we fail the more our involvement is justified.

By the time George W. Bush left office he had spent trillions of dollars on what he and his administration called the global war on terror. According to Robert Scheer, the United States proceeded to go to war not against the enemy that existed but rather the one desired by the Military Industrial Complex (Scheer, p. 13). This is a powerful sector that encourages more government spending than any other. To rationalize the spending a new official doctrine of preemptive war has been adopted. It is embodied in the concept of ‘war on terror’, an unending war against an abstract concept.